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Abstract
This paper analyzes peer e¤ects among siblings in the decision to leave
parental home. Estimating peer e¤ects is challenging because of problems of
reection, endogenous group formation, and correlated unobservables. We over-
come these issues using the exogenous variation in siblingshousehold formation
implied by the eligibility rules for a Spanish rental subsidy. Our results show
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presence of old or ill parents. Sibling e¤ects turn positive for close-in-age sib-
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1 Introduction
The proportion of young adults living with their parents is three times higher in
Southern European countries than in Northern European ones.1 Moreover, this pro-
portion has increased sharply in Southern Europe during the last three decades.2
Policy makers are concerned about young adults late household formation because it
may critically a¤ect family formation decisions, overall fertility rates, youth labour
supply, labour mobility, and the sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems. As a
consequence, several governments have implemented measures or advocated the need
for incentives to promote household formation (for instance, the Portuguese "Porta
65" program in 2007, the Spanish "Renta Basica di Emancipacion" in 2008, and the
French "Aide Mobili-Jeune" in 2013).
Social interactions are particularly interesting for policy makers because they may
alter the impact of policies. In the presence of peer e¤ects in household formation,
individualsdecision to leave parental home in response to a policy could a¤ect their
peershousehold formation decision, even when the latter are not directly a¤ected
by the reform. Among social interactions, siblingsones are particularly interesting
because, di¤erently from other peer interactions, they happen within the household
and they are more intense and lasting. In fact, siblings have often been found to be
the most inuential peers (Lindahl, 2011, Nicoletti and Rabe, 2013 and Dahl et al.,
2014). This paper analyzes sibling e¤ects in the decision to form a new household,
i.e., the impact of having a sibling who forms a new household in the same time
period.
Sibling e¤ects in household formation can be positive or negative. They can
be positive due to imitation or information transmission. Imitation among siblings
may reect an intrinsic desire to behave like others and is stronger for smaller age
di¤erences and from older to younger siblings (Barr and Hayne, 2003). The decision
of an individual to form a new household may also reect information transmission
about the costs and benets of leaving parental home, so that the choices of any
single person modify the information available to all her siblings (Duo and Saez,
2003). However, sibling e¤ects may also operate in the opposite direction (Angrist
and Lang, 2004). First, if a sibling has left parental home, the quantity of public
goods available for the remaining siblings increases, reducing their incentive to form
a new household. Parents may also increase household resources to the remaining
sibling in response to the higher risk of remaining alone: Manacorda and Moretti
1In 2010, almost 60 percent of young people in the 18-34 age bracket lived in their parental homes
in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, whilst that statistic is below 40 percent in France, the UK,
and the Netherlands, and as low as 20 percent in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Source: Eurostat,
EU-SILC.
2Angelini and Laferrere (2013) show that both cultural traits and the parental ability to help their
children by either providing them with a home, or with a nancial transfer to move out, a¤ected the
nest living patterns over time and across European countries. For an analysis on the heterogeneity
of parental altruism across countries see Horioka (2014).
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(2006) show that if children have a preference for living on their own, some parents
are willing to trade o¤ their own consumption to bribe their children into staying at
home. Second, children of lone parents are observed leaving the nest at a lower rate
(Mencarini et al., 2010). In this case, an individuals decision to leave parental home
may induce her siblings to stay home. Similarly, the presence of old or ill parents may
delay young individualshousehold formation in response to their siblingsdecision
to leave parental home if remaining children need to stay home to take care of the
parent.3 In our empirical analysis, we determine whether positive or negative sibling
e¤ects prevail in practice.
Estimating causal e¤ects arising from social interactions is challenging. As Manski
(1993) pointed out, estimation of these e¤ects needs to deal with problems of simul-
taneous causality, correlated unobservables, and endogenous group membership. Re-
searchers have used di¤erent strategies to tackle these issues. Some authors attempt
to control for as many observable characteristics as possible, or use instrumental vari-
ables.4 Others identify peer e¤ects by exploiting exogenous group assignment.5 A
third approach consists in studying peer e¤ects in naturally occurring groups, and
exploiting random variation in exposure to the treatment for a random subset of in-
dividuals.6 This last strategy is called partial population approach (Mo¢ tt, 2001).
The exogenous variation in the papers that adopt the partial population approach
often comes from policies or legislation changes. Angelucci et al. (2010) and Lalive
and Cattaneo (2009) exploit a randomized intervention in the context of the Progresa
aid program, Dahl et al. (2014) analyze the introduction of the Norwegian paternity
leave quota in 1993 and Hesselius et al. (2009) study the deferral of the monitoring
of sickness absence for a group of randomly selected individuals in Sweden.
We follow the partial population approach and examine the causal e¤ect of a sib-
lings household formation decision on the individuals probability of leaving parental
home. We use data from the Spanish Survey on Income and Living Conditions which
follows individuals over time, even when forming a new household. Our identication
strategy makes use of the panel structure of the data and the exogenous eligibility
criteria for a Spanish rental subsidy that signicantly a¤ects household formation
rates. The panel data nature of our sample allows us to di¤erence out any individ-
ual or household time-invariant unobservable characteristic; the exogenous eligibility
criteria for the rental subsidy allow us to deal with other omitted variables as well
as reverse causality concerns. Our ndings suggest that there are negative siblings
3Children may o¤er caregiving activities out of altruism for their parents, or in exchange for mon-
etary incentives o¤ered by the family members beneting from the services received. See Grossbard
(2014) for a discussion on the motives behind caregiving.
4See, for instance Bayer et al., (2008), Burke and Sass (2013), Carrell et al., (2008), Gaviria and
Raphael (2001), Hensvik and Nilsson (2010), Maurin and Moschion (2009) and Nicoletti and Rabe
(2014).
5See, for instance, Carrell et al., (2011), Hoxby (2000), Katz et al., (2001) and Sacerdote, (2001).
6See Angelucci et al. (2010), Baird et al. (2012), Dahl et al. (2014), Hesselius et al., (2009) and
Lalive and Cattaneo (2009).
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e¤ects on household formation: youngsters who leave their parental home delay their
siblingsdecision to leave. When looking at the mechanisms, negative sibling e¤ects
can be explained by the remaining sibling staying longer in the parental home in the
presence of an old or ill parent. The e¤ect could be led by female individuals stay-
ing at home after their sister has left parental home. Estimated sibling e¤ects turn
positive for close-in-age siblings. Overall, siblingsinteractions reduce the impact of
policies that foster household formation unless age di¤erences between siblings are
small.
There is some evidence on the e¤ects of peer behavior in living arrangements.
Using Italian data, Di Stefano (2008) estimates a structural model in which young
adults simultaneously choose labor supply, residential arrangement and marital status
conditional on the social norm on the age at rst marriage, endogenously determined
as an equilibrium outcome. Although she does not analyze specically sibling e¤ects,
her results indicate that young adults, and especially women, tend to conform to
each other, which is a sign of the existence of peer e¤ects. Adamopoulou and Kaya
(2013), using peerscharacteristics as an instrument for the fraction of peers who have
left parental home, nd evidence of positive peer e¤ects among North-American high
school friends. Numerous studies have produced empirical evidence documenting
the existence of relevant siblings interactions in many areas.7 To the best of our
knowledge, we are the rst to explore the role of sibling e¤ects on the decision to
leave parental home.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
setting and data. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 provides
a discussion of the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutions and data
2.1 Institutional background
Announced in September 2007 and enacted since January 2008, the Basic Rent for
Emancipation is a monetary subsidy introduced by the Spanish Ministry of Housing
with the aim of fostering youngstershousehold formation. The government expected
to achieve this goal by reducing young individualsrental expenses. The policy also
aimed at promoting youngsterseconomic independence and geographical mobility.
The subsidy pays e 210 monthly for a maximum period of four years. Eligibles
may also benet from an additional e 120 to pay the bank guarantee associated
with the rental contract, and a one-time e 600 loan to pay the rent deposit in case
they sign a new rental contract. To appreciate the magnitude of the subsidy, it
can be useful to compare it with the average Spanish youngstersmonthly earnings.
7Solon et al. (1991), Bjorklund et al. (2002), Mazumder (2008), and Schnitzlein (2014) investigate
sibling e¤ects in income; Björklund and Salvanes (2011) and Nicoletti and Rabe (2014) in school
achievement; Kuziemko (2006) in fertility; and Altonji et al. (2013) in teenage substance use.
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Average gross monthly earnings of young people in the 20-24 age brackets amount
to e 1,100 in 2008.8 The subsidy is therefore equivalent to almost 20 percent of
the average gross salary of a young person. By July 2011, the subsidy was given
to 35 percent of households headed by an individual aged 22 to 29 (including both
renters and homeowners). In September 2011, as a consequence of the worsening of
the economic recession in Spain, the government announced the cancellation of the
Renta Basica de Emancipacion, which came into force from the end of December
2011. New households formed after that date were not eligible for the rental subsidy.
However, eligible households who applied for the rental subsidy before the end of
2011 still beneted after that date but received a lower amount of subsidy.
To be eligible for the subsidy, youngsters need to be in the 22-29 age bracket and
have a rental contract. This includes individuals that had a rental contract before
becoming eligible.9 Those who do not have a rental contract may request the subsidy
conditional on providing the contract signed in three months time. Eligibles need to
certify that they are employed, autonomous workers, grant holders, or receivers of a
periodic social benet (including unemployment benet). The latter are also required
to have worked for at least six months or provide evidence that the social benet will
last for at least six months. For all the eligibles, the net source of income must
not exceed e 1,500 per month. EU citizens and non-EU citizens with a permanent
resident permit are eligible. If several individuals are sharing accommodation, each
young adult entitled to the subsidy receives a share of the subsidy proportional to
the number of people who sign the rental contract. Individuals who rent out from
close family members are not eligible. In our empirical analysis we dene subsidy
eligibility exclusively on the basis of age and time of the survey, the only criteria that
are impossible to manipulate.10
2.2 Data
Our main dataset consists of the 2005-2010 waves of the Spanish data from the
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The data
contain a wide range of information on individuals and households characteristics.
Individuals are surveyed yearly and stay in the sample for four consecutive years. If
an individual forms a new household during that time, both the old and the new
households are interviewed. If the new household does not respond (in cases, for
instance, in which the individual has died or moved abroad), the old household reports
whether the individual has formed a new household.
8Source: Spanish Wage Structure Survey, 2008.
9Note that the policy does not generate incentives to postpone emancipation for 21 year-olds.
Emancipated 21 year-olds will be entitled to the same amount of subsidy as soon as they become
eligible. Aparicio and Oppedisano (2014) provide an empirical test that conrms that postponement
is not signicant.
10Aparicio and Oppedisano (2014) show that the majority of individuals who were eligible in terms
of age actually fullled all other criteria.
5
The estimation sample includes 6,435 individuals in the 18-34 age group living
with their parents, and their siblings observed while living with their parents who
are over 18 and at most 10 years older (in the 18-44 age group). We keep pairs of
siblings one year after the sibling built up an independent household (79 out of 6,435
observations) and even two years after the sibling built up a household (6 out of
6,435 observations).11 The panel is unbalanced: individuals who become 18 during
the survey period enter the sample only after they turn 18. Similarly, individuals who
become 34 during the survey period exit the sample as soon as they turn 34. The
sample is composed by all pairs of siblings, and as in Altonji et al. (2013) we focus
on the e¤ect of the older siblings household formation on the younger individuals
one. We select the period 2005-2010, as the cancellation of the policy was announced
in 2011 and enacted from the end of that year.
Building up an independent household is measured by a dummy equal to one in
the year in which the individual (the sibling) leaves parental home and the years
following that.12 Siblings household formation is dened with a dummy equal to one
if the sibling has left the parental home in the same time period. Our analysis focuses
on how the policy a¤ects ows out of the parental home, and therefore indirectly the
stock of individuals living independently from their parents.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the whole sample, the sample of indi-
viduals interviewed in the pre-policy period (2005-2007), the sample of individuals
interviewed in the post-policy period (2008-2010), the sample of individuals with
no-eligible siblings and the sample of individuals with eligible siblings. Almost 60
percent of individuals in the sample live with their parents, around 4.6 percent of
the sample has left parental home over the period 2005-2010 and 10.2 percent of
individuals have at least one sibling who has left parental home over the same time
period, with both statistics being slightly higher in the post-policy period. Individ-
uals with no-eligible siblings leave parental home at a higher rate than those with
eligible siblings, suggesting that the policy may induce the remaining individuals to
stay home after one sibling has left. Around 60 percent of siblings are eligible for the
rental subsidy in the post-policy period. Slightly more than half of respondents are
male. Siblings in the sample are around 4 years older than individuals (26 versus
21.7 years of age). As a consequence, siblings have a higher probability of having
completed secondary education (61% versus 48% in the sample of individuals) and
tertiary education (28% versus 11% in the sample of individuals), and an average
higher gross annual income (e6,934.55 versus e3,810.7 in the sample of individuals).
Statistics on gross income, the regional yearly unemployment and GDP growth rates
highlight how the macroeconomic conditions worsened in the post-policy period as a
11We ran our regressions omitting observations for the years after the sibling emancipated and
results are very similar to those obtained when they are included. Results are available from the
authors upon request.
12The time frame does not include 2005 because, for individuals interviewed in 2005, we observe
household formation decisions from 2006.
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consequence of the economic recession.
The basic idea behind the identication strategy is illustrated in Figure 1. The
solid lines show the trends in household formation rates of individuals with and with-
out eligible siblings. The gure shows that the trends were parallel before the policy
was implemented, and diverge after the introduction of the policy, illustrating the
source of exogenous variation of our identication strategy. The trend in household
formation rates of individuals who have eligible siblings lies below that of those who
have non-eligible siblings. This happens because individuals with eligible siblings are
younger on average, although the age di¤erence is not signicant. The two trends
diverge slightly from 2008 to 2009 and start diverging signicantly after 2009. This
delay can be explained by the nature of our data. Individuals that report having
formed a household in 2009 have actually done it at any point in time between their
interview in 2008 and the interview in 2009. The two dashed lines above and below
each solid line represent condence intervals. The condence intervals present signif-
icant overlap in the pre-treatment period which suggests that the two groups are not
signicantly di¤erent in terms of the characteristics that drive the decision to form a
new household. The overlap is signicantly reduced after the implementation of the
policy, mainly due to the divergence between the two trends.
3 Empirical strategy
Peer e¤ects occur when an individuals action inuences the action of another indi-
vidual in the same social group. However, measuring peer e¤ects has proven di¢ cult
(Manski, 1993). First, if peers i and j a¤ect each other, then it is di¢ cult to separate
out the actual causal e¤ect that individual is outcome has on individual js outcome.
This is commonly called the reection problem and it is likely to arise whenever indi-
vidual and peer behaviour are determined simultaneously. Second, unobserved group
characteristics and individual traits that are correlated within the group may in-
duce articial correlation among peer outcomes. Finally, self-selection in peer groups
represents another challenge in the estimation of peer e¤ects.
In our setting, the rst two challenges are present: siblings are likely to inuence
each other; and unobservable family and individual characteristics, such as strength of
family ties, taste for independence and privacy, are likely unobserved and correlated
among siblings. However, self-selection is not an issue in the context of exogenously-
formed peer groups as siblings.
Our objective is to obtain an estimate that is informative about the causal e¤ect of
siblings choices on individuals household formation. To this, we followMo¢ tt (2001)
and Dahl et al. (2014) partial population approach, which exploits quasi-random vari-
ation in the net benet of participating to a treatment for some individuals in a group
and see how other members in the group change their behavior. In particular, we
take advantage of the exogenous increase in the propensity to form a new household
for siblings in the 22-29 age range induced by the introduction of the Spanish rental
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subsidy in 2008 and see how individuals in the 18-21 and 30-34 age groups change
their behaviour. Our identication strategy relies on exogenous variation in siblings
eligibility for the rental subsidy. We exploit two sources of variation. One source
of variation is determined by the year of the interview. Siblings interviewed before
2008 did not benet from the program, since the rental subsidy only came into force
in January 2008 and hence, only some siblings interviewed after that date were fully
eligible. The other source of variation arises from age. Due to the eligibility criteria
established by the law, only siblings in the 22-29 age group were entitled to the sub-
sidy. In order to get a sense of the correlation between siblingshousehold formation
decisions, we estimate the following equation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
yi;t = 0 + 1yj;t + 2tt + 3ej + 4Xi;t + 5Xj;t + i;j + "i;t (1)
where yi;t is a dummy equal to one if individual i has left parental home in period t
and yj;t is the corresponding value for sibling j. The coe¢ cient 1 captures the e¤ect
of having a sibling who has formed a new household on the individuals probability
of leaving parental home; ej is a dummy variable for sibling j being in the 22-29 age
group, tt is a time dummy equal to one for individuals and siblings interviewed in
2008 and after. The vectors Xi;t and Xj;t contain the following control variables: year
dummies, individuals and siblings male dummy, individuals and siblings log of age,
individuals and siblings secondary and tertiary education dummies (education level
attained in the previous year), individuals and siblings gross yearly income (earned in
the past year), dummy for individuals region of residence (Comunidades Autonomas
by their Spanish name), and dummies for the month of interview, which capture
the "seasonality e¤ect", i.e. any systematic di¤erences in household formation rates
implied by the calendar period of the year. Finally, as the subsidy was introduced in
the same year as that in which the economic recession began, we include controls for
the regional yearly unemployment and GDP growth rates to isolate the potential e¤ect
of the recession. i;j represents the vector of the sibling-pair xed e¤ects and " is the
error term. We cluster residuals at the household level to account for unobservable
household characteristics, including taste for independence and attachment to the
family. Unfortunately, the OLS estimated 1 coe¢ cient would be biased due to
reection and correlated unobservables.
For our identication strategy to be meaningful, we rst need the subsidy to be
e¤ective in promoting household formation in the sample of siblings. To check this
we estimate the following specication by OLS:
yj;t = 0 + 1tt + 2ej + 3ejtt + 4Xj;t + 5Xi;t + i;j + "jt (2)
where the coe¢ cient 3 captures the e¤ect of the sibling being eligible for the subsidy
on the probability that the sibling forms a household.
In our baseline specication, we assume household formation is a function of the
siblingssubsidy eligibility and individual controls. This corresponds to the reduced-
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form equation of the model that provides the intention-to-treat estimates (ITT) by
OLS. The equation reads as follows:
yi;t = 0 + 1tt + 2ej + 3ejtt + 4Xi;t + 5Xj;t + i;j + "i;t (3)
where the coe¢ cient 3 captures the causal impact of a siblings eligibility on the
individuals probability of leaving parental home. Note that in our main specication
we estimate the e¤ect of siblings eligibility on the individuals likelihood of leaving
the nest in the same year.
The validity of the estimation proposed in Equation 3 relies on the use of panel
data and the exogeneity of the rental subsidy. The panel data nature of our sample
allows us to di¤erence out any sibling-pair xed over time unobservable component.13
However, in the context of a standard xed-e¤ect estimation, it remains di¢ cult to
rule out the possibility of reverse causality and time varying unobservables. The ex-
ogenous change induced by the rental subsidy addresses concerns arising both from
potential reverse causality and omitted variables: individual household formation
does not a¤ect siblings eligibility and hence, the use of the dummy for siblings sub-
sidy eligibility rather than siblings household formation solves the reverse causality
problem. Moreover, as a consequence of the policy design, the siblings eligibility
dummy ejtt is orthogonal to any unobserved covariates and hence correlated unob-
servables can no longer bias the estimates.
Equation 3 is informative about how policies promoting individualshousehold
formation a¤ect their siblings. However, it is also a reduced form approach to esti-
mate sibling e¤ects on household formation. For the latter purpose, we could have
opted for a two-stage least-squares (TSLS) estimate in which subsidy eligibility serves
as an instrument for siblings household formation. To consistently estimate the size
of the sibling e¤ect via TSLS, one also needs to assume that the only channel through
which individuals are a¤ected by siblingseligibility is siblingshousehold formation.
This could be problematic if household formation means something di¤erent before
and after the subsidy implementation, with individuals forming a household in the
post-policy period sending a di¤erent signal to their siblings. TSLS also requires the
monotonicity assumption that the subsidy would not induce any young individuals to
stay longer at parental home which may have happened if the subsidy increased com-
petition for accommodation. Moreover, the assumptions required for the estimation
of average treatment e¤ects by TSLS are incompatible with the discrete nature of the
outcome, the endogenous variable and the instrument (Chesher and Rosen, 2013).
Finally, the alternative option of non-parametric instrumental variable approach as
in Chesher (2009) delivers too wide intervals in our case.
13We also estimated all the outcomes using household and individual xed e¤ects and results are
invariant.
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4 Results
4.1 Individual and siblings household formation: OLS re-
gression
We rst report the results of the naive estimation of the coe¢ cients 0  3 of Equa-
tion 1 by OLS in Table 2. The rst column shows the specication that controls for
individuals characteristics, in the second we add siblings characteristics and in the
third one we also include macroeconomic time varying controls. In each column we
control for the sibling being in the 22-29 age group, the dummy for being interviewed
in the post-policy period, and for sibling-pair xed e¤ects. The OLS estimates show
positive and signicant correlations between siblings household formation in all spec-
ications, with the e¤ect slightly decreasing when we include siblings characteristics,
and not being a¤ected by the inclusion of the macroeconomic variables.
The positive correlation between individual and siblings household formation
could be easily justied by the common background shared by siblings or be an
outcome of the reection problem. To learn about causal e¤ects, we next interpret
the specications that use subsidy eligibility as an explanatory variable.
4.2 The impact of the subsidy on siblings household forma-
tion
Our identication strategy relies on the e¤ectiveness of the rental subsidy in fostering
household formation among siblings. Table 3 presents estimates of the coe¢ cients
0   3 in Equation 2. The di¤erent columns replicate the structure of Table 2. The
coe¢ cient of interest is the interaction between the dummy for being interviewed after
2008, and the dummy for the siblings being in the 22-29 age group, which captures
the siblings eligibility to the subsidy. The coe¢ cient is positive and statistically
signicant in all three specications. The size of the coe¢ cient slightly increases after
the inclusion of the siblings controls but it remains una¤ected by the inclusion of
the macroeconomic controls. The coe¢ cient in the full sample indicates that subsidy
eligibility increases the propensity to leave the nest by 5 percent. These estimates
are higher than those obtained by Aparicio and Oppedisano (2014), who estimated
a lower bound e¤ect of 3 percent. A possible explanation for the higher coe¢ cient
could rely on the fact that the time frame used in the two papers is di¤erent: while
in the previous paper we focused on the 2006-2009 time period, here we look at the
2005-2010 time period. If it takes time for the policy to be known among eligible
young adults and for the applications for the subsidy to be processed, the e¤ect of
the policy should increase over time, and be on average larger if a wider time frame
is considered.14 The F test in the last row of Table 3 indicates that although the
14Spanish newspapers documented that some regions experienced delays in processing the subsidy
during the rst months of its application due to lack of communication between administrative
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policy is e¤ective in promoting siblingshousehold formation, it cannot be used as
an instrument in a TSLS estimation. Therefore, in the rest of the paper we mainly
focus on the reduced form specication.
4.3 The impact of siblings eligibility on household formation
Results in Table 3 show that siblingseligibility for the rental subsidy signicantly
a¤ects the probability that a sibling leaves the nest. In this section, we exploit the
exogenous variation in exposure to the subsidy across youngsters, to assess the causal
impact of the siblings eligibility to the subsidy on the probability of forming a new
household.
We estimate Equation 3 and focus on the interaction between the post policy
dummy and the dummy equal to one if the older sibling is in the 22-29 age group.
Table 4 shows that the estimate of the impact of siblings subsidy eligibility on house-
hold formation is negative and signicant at 1 percent level in all specications. In
terms of magnitude, siblings subsidy eligibility decreases the probability of leaving
the nest by 5.7 percentage points in the specication with the full set of controls.
Thus, the direction of the e¤ect estimated in the reduced form specication is oppo-
site to the positive e¤ect delivered by the naive OLS estimation.
4.4 Mechanisms and alternative specications
Next, we explore the mechanisms behind the estimation results in Table 4. We then
analyze whether results change for close-in-age siblings. To achieve the rst objec-
tive, we interact the siblings eligibility dummy with a set of time varying parental
characteristics. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 5. In the rst column, we
include the interaction of the siblings eligibility dummy with a dummy indicating
whether the youngest parent is less than fty years old. This interaction has a pos-
itive and signicant e¤ect on individuals household formation. The magnitude of
the coe¢ cient is such that it completely o¤sets the overall negative e¤ect, suggesting
that parental age can be behind the negative sibling e¤ect: if the youngest partner
is more than fty years old then the household formation decision of one sibling will
induce the other one to remain in the parental home. Di¤erently, the presence of a
younger than fty years old parent, who may take care of the older partner, will not
deter the individuals decision to leave parental home after the sibling has left.
In the second column, the siblings eligibility dummy is interacted with a dummy
equal to one if at least one of the parents is healthy. This dummy is constructed
from a survey question about the individuals general health status. Respondents
can dene their health status as very good, good, regular, bad or very bad. We
dene an individual to be healthy if her health status is regular, good, or very good.
The coe¢ cient of the interaction between the siblings eligibility dummy and the
entities (El Pais, 05/02/2008).
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dummy for at least one healthy parent is positive and statistically signicant. The
magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient is such that it o¤sets more than 75 per cent of
the overall e¤ect. This result indicates that another channel through which negative
sibling e¤ects arise is through parental health: if none of the parents is healthy and
one sibling leaves the nest, the other sibling will respond by remaining in the parental
home. If at least one parent is healthy (the reference category) the remaining sibling
does not show a lower probability of forming a household. The third column of
the upper panel of Table 5 shows the interactions of the eligibility dummy with the
individuals and siblings gender combinations.15 Results do not show any signicant
gender di¤erence but suggest that if there were gender di¤erences, the e¤ect will be
driven by women with emancipating sisters, consistently with the hypothesis that
parental caregiving activities are often femalesduties.
In Panel B of Table 5, column one and two report the interactions of the siblings
eligibility dummy with the siblings education and income level and show that the
siblings income and education seem to increase the magnitude of the negative sibling
e¤ect.16 Our results suggest that the decision to leave parental home could depend
on the completion of education and on a su¢ ciently high level of income. If attitudes
towards risks and tastes are correlated between siblings, individuals may learn from
their siblings that they should stay at the parental home while they are students or
until they earn a su¢ cient level of income.
Negative siblingse¤ects may also arise because the remaining sibling may take
advantage of the higher quantity of public goods available to her as a consequence
of her sibling having left the parental home. We try to assess this e¤ect using the
number of rooms in the house at the time the household is interviewed for the rst
time as a proxy for public good. In unreported regressions, we do not nd that
individuals living in smaller houses are more likely to leave the nest than those living
in larger houses, and we therefore tend to count out that public goods as measured
by the space in the house explain negative sibling e¤ects.
Note that negative siblingse¤ects can also be explained by an increase in house-
hold resources enjoyed by the remaining children if parents are willing to bribe their
children into staying at home. Unfortunately, our data do not convey information on
transfers from parents to the child, and therefore we cannot assess the importance of
this mechanism in siblingsinteractions.
Next, we explore whether the sibling e¤ect is di¤erent if we consider the sample of
close-in-age siblings. Following Barr and Hayne (2003), we hypothesize that close in
age siblings are more likely to imitate each other. We dene a dummy variable equal to
15The coe¢ cients of the dummies for the combinations of individuals and siblings gender are not
identied as they are absorbed by the sibling-pair xed e¤ects.
16The variable siblings education reects the number of completed levels of education. This is,
it equals 0 for siblings who did not complete any educational level, 1 for siblings who completed
the rst level (primary education), 2 for siblings who hold the second level diploma (secondary
education) and 3 for siblings who completed the third level (tertiary education).
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one if siblings are at most two years apart. Results are reported in column 3 of Panel
B of Table 5. The coe¢ cient of this interaction is positive and statistically signicant,
and not only it o¤sets the negative e¤ect of the siblings eligibility interaction, but it
exceeds it. This indicates that sibling e¤ects become positive for close-in-age siblings:
when individuals leave the nest, their less-than-two-years younger siblings are more
likely to follow them in the decision to form a new household.
In order to check whether di¤erences in the impact of the economic crisis on em-
ployment prospects of di¤erent age groups could be behind our result, we replicated
our main regression (Equation 3) using employment as a dependent variable instead
of household formation. Results show that there is no signicant di¤erence in employ-
ment changes between age groups and if anything individuals with eligible siblings
are more likely to be employed and hence to a¤ord household formation (see Table
6).
TSLS would be a valid estimation strategy under the additional assumptions of
monotonicity and the exclusion restriction. In an unreported regression, the co-
e¢ cient of the specication with the full set of controls is negative and statistically
signicant at 10 percent level, indicating that the individual decision to leave parental
home reduces the siblings probability of forming a new household, conrming the di-
rection of the sibling e¤ects. As we mentioned in Section 3, the assumptions required
for the estimation of average treatment e¤ects by TSLS are incompatible with the
discrete nature of the outcome, the endogenous variable, the instrument and most
of our controls. Moreover, the F-test indicates the weakness of the rst stage for
our sample. Therefore, we omit a detailed interpretation of the size of the TSLS
coe¢ cients, as it is uninformative of the true size of the e¤ect in this setting.
In all our analysis we study contemporaneous sibling e¤ects, showing the e¤ect
of a siblings eligibility on the individuals choice to form a new household in the
same year. However, it may be interesting to look at whether these e¤ects persist, or
dissipate over time. As individuals are interviewed only four times, we can analyze
the e¤ect of siblings eligibility on next year probability that the individual will leave
parental home.
In an unreported regression we estimate Equation 3 with a lagged (rather than
contemporaneous) siblings eligibility dummy. Results show that siblingseligibility
one year before reduces the probability of the individuals forming a new household
by 2.5 percent. However, the e¤ect is not signicant at conventional levels, suggesting
that the negative impact may fade out one year later.
Finally, we provide further evidence on the validity of our di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimation strategy and perform a placebo test pretending that the policy was im-
plemented in 2007. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 7. Estimated
coe¢ cients are small in magnitude and non-signicant, indicating that there are no
pre-existing trends in the data that could drive our results. The same happens when
we pretend that the policy was implemented in 2006.
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5 Conclusion
The transition to adulthood is a complex process made of several interrelated steps
such as leaving school, nding a job, nding a partner, etc. It culminates with the
formation of an independent household, possibly with a partner, and usually implies
moving out of the parental residence. The increasingly late age at which young adults
in Southern Europe postpone household formation decisions has led governments, in
the last decade, to implement policies that foster the decision to leave the nest, by
reducing young adultsrental expenses. If peer e¤ects among siblings in the choice of
leaving parental home exist, then these incentives may amplify or reduce the aggregate
impact of these policies depending on whether sibling e¤ects are positive or negative,
which remains an open empirical question.
We empirically analyze the role of sibling e¤ects on household formation decisions
in the context of Spain, a Southern European country characterized by late household
formation. To this, we make use of the exogenous variation in household formation
for a subset of young individuals eligible for the rental subsidy, and exploit the panel
data dimension of the EU-SILC data. Our results suggest that siblingsinteractions
reduce the impact of policies that foster household formation, except for the case
in which subsidy recipients are close-in-age siblings, consistently with the hypothesis
that the willingness to imitate a sibling is stronger in correspondence of small age
gaps. When exploring the channels through which negative sibling e¤ects are exerted,
we nd that individuals who further delay the decision to form a new household after
a sibling has left do so in presence of old or ill parents. Moreover, results suggest
that individuals learn from their siblings that they should stay at the parental home
while they are students or until they earn a su¢ cient level of income. We cannot rule
out with available data that the enjoyment of higher public goods for the remaining
sibling, or transfers from the parents that try to bribe the remaining children at home
are other mechanisms at play.
Overall, in the context of Southern European countries, where family ties are
strong, there is more reliance on home production and less participation in market
activities as individuals tend to trust more family members (Alesina and Giuliano,
2010). Caring for the elderly is a typical activity demanded to household production
in these countries. A policy that aims at fostering the household formation process
should account for household composition as well. In particular, our ndings indicate
that policy makers should target the household rather than the individual. Policy
makers should also combine policies for young adults with policies for elderly.
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Figures
Figure 1: Trends in household formation rates for individuals with eligible
and non-eligible siblings
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Data source: EU-SILC 2005-2010. The two dashed lines above and below each solid
line represent condence intervals (constructed at a 95% condence level).
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All sample 2005-2007 2008-2010 non-eligible sibling eligible sibling
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
Living with parents 0.827 0.813 0.796 0.835 0.821
(0.378) (0.39) (0.403) (0.371) (0.383)
Parental home leaving 0.046 0.043 0.049 0.088 0.021
(0.210) (0.203) (0.217) (0.284) (0.144)
Siblings parental home leaving 0.102 0.099 0.104 0.102 0.101
(0.302) (0.299) (0.305) (0.303) (0.302)
Siblings subsidy eligibility 0.287 0.000 0.604 0 0.461
(0.453) (0.000) (0.489) (0) (0.499)
Siblings age eligibility 0.623 0.641 0.604 0 1
(0.484) (0.480) (0.489) (0) (0)
Male 0.520 0.534 0.504 0.522 0.518
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500) (0.5) (0.5)
Individuals age 21.743 21.593 21.907 25.236 19.63
(4.852) (4.688) (5.021) (6.398) (1.089)
Siblings age 25.980 25.835 26.138 28.248 24.608
(5.981) (5.140) (5.423) (7.698) (1.983)
Individuals with secondary education 0.476 0.467 0.486 0.44 0.498
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500) (0.496) (0.5)
Individuals with tertiary education 0.107 0.100 0.114 0.189 0.057
(0.309) (0.300) (0.318) (0.391) (0.232)
Siblings with secondary education 0.610 0.597 0.625 0.539 0.654
(0.488) (0..490) (0.484) (0.499) (0.476)
Siblings with tertiary education 0.285 0.272 0.300 0.219 0.325
(0.451) (0.445) (0.458) (0.414) (0.468)
Individual gross income 0.045 0.046 0.043 0.086 0.029
(0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.094) (0.051)
Individual income=0 0.509 0.477 0.544 0.414 0.567
(0.5) (0.5) (0.498) (0.493) (0.496)
Sibling gross income 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.102 0.08
(0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.103) (0.086)
Siblings income=0 0.342 0.32 0.367 0.376 0.321
(0.474) (0.466) (0.482) (0.485) (0.467)
Regional yearly unemployment rate 12.704 9.288 16.461 12.812 12.639
(5.960) (3.182) (6.043) (6.143) (5.848)
Regional yearly GDP growth rate 4.166 7.870 0.092 3.898 4.327
(4.421) (0.883) (2.912) (4.43) (4.407)
Observations 6,435 3,370 3,065 2,425 4,010
The variable living with parents is the proportion of young individuals living with
their parents. Parental home leavingrefers to young individuals who leave their parental
home and in doing so create a new household. Individual and sibling gross incomes are
expressed in thousands.
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Table 2: OLS regression of sibling household formation on individuals
household formation - Equation 1
(1) (2) (3)
Siblings parental home leaving - 1 0.059 0.053 0.053
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Post-policy period - 2 0.483 0.586 0.63
(0.089) (0.111) (0.128)
Sibling in the 22-29 age group - 3 0.0007 0.01 0.01
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Intercept - 0 4.676 6.808 6.830
(0.954) (1.377) (1.357)
Individual controls yes yes yes
Siblings controls no yes yes
Macroeconomic controls no no yes
Observations 6,435 6,435 6,435
R2 0.388 0.433 0.433
Notes: EU-SILC data. This table shows the xed e¤ects OLS regression of siblings household
formation on individuals household formation. Individual controls include: year dummies, the log
of age, male dummy, secondary and tertiary education dummies, gross yearly income, dummy for
individuals region of residence, month of interview dummies. Siblings control include: log of age,
male dummy, secondary and tertiary education dummies, gross yearly income. Macroeconomic
controls include the regional yearly unemployment and the GDP growth rates. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: OLS regression of siblings eligibility on siblings household for-
mation - Equation 2
(1) (2) (3)
Siblings subsidy eligibility - 3 0.051 0.052 0.052
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Post-policy period - 1 0.552 0.593 0.61
(0.099) (0.123) (0.141)
Sibling in the 22-29 age group - 2 -.086 -.081 -.081
(0.02) (0.021) (0.021)
Intercept - 0 2.198 2.927 3.160
(1.188) (1.721) (1.731)
Individual controls yes yes yes
Siblings controls no yes yes
Macroeconomic controls no no yes
Observations 6,435 6,435 6,435
R2 0.136 0.137 0.137
F test F(1,2610)=4.25 F(1,2610)=4.5 F(1,2610)=4.58
Prob > F 0.0394 0.0341 0.0324
Notes: EU-SILC data. This table shows the xed e¤ects OLS regression of siblings eligibility
(the interaction between the dummy for being interviewed after 2008, and the dummy for the sibling
being in the 22-29 age group) on siblings household formation. F-test for the hypothesis that 3 = 0.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: OLS Reduced form regression of siblings eligibility on household
formation - Equation 3
(1) (2) (3)
Siblings subsidy eligibility - 3 -.064 -.058 -.057
(0.02) (0.02) (0.019)
Post-policy period - 1 0.511 0.607 0.646
(0.089) (0.11) (0.125)
Sibling in the 22-29 age group - 2 0.027 0.033 0.033
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Intercept - 0 4.215 6.341 6.349
(0.876) (1.293) (1.278)
Individual controls yes yes yes
Siblings controls no yes yes
Macroeconomic controls no no yes
Observations 6,435 6,435 6,435
R2 0.387 0.432 0.433
F test F(1,2610)=9.98 F(1,2610)=8.61 F(1,2610)=8.69
Prob > F 0.0016 0.0034 0.0032
Notes: EU-SILC data. This table shows the xed e¤ects OLS regression of siblings eligibility
(the interaction between the dummy for being interviewed after 2008, and the dummy for the sibling
being in the 22-29 age group) on individuals household formation. F-test for the hypothesis that
3 = 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: OLS Reduced form regression - Mechanisms - Equation 3
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Siblings subsidy eligibility -.107 -.117 -.083
(0.03) (0.046) (0.043)
Siblings eligibility*Parent<50 0.124
(0.032)
Parent<50 0.078
(0.03)
Siblings eligibility*Healthy parent 0.086
(0.047)
Healthy parent -.018
(0.024)
Siblings eligibility*Male i, male j 0.015
(0.054)
Siblings eligibility*Male i, female j 0.065
(0.049)
Siblings eligibility*Female i, male j 0.027
(0.055)
Post-policy period 0.61 0.549 0.661
(0.118) (0.116) (0.14)
Sibling in the 22-29 age group 0.071 0.022 0.052
(0.022) (0.023) (0.026)
Intercept 5.169 4.370 6.373
(1.191) (1.050) (1.297)
Obs. 6435 6269 6435
R2 0.439 0.436 0.434
F test F(2, 2610) =7.44 F(2,2610)=4.7 F(4,2610)=2.75
Prob > F 0.0006 0.0092 0.0266
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Panel B
Siblings subsidy eligibility 0.038 -.007 -.075
(0.044) (0.016) (0.024)
Siblings eligibility*Siblings educ -.052
(0.025)
Siblings education -.006
(0.023)
Siblings eligibility*Siblings income -.007
(0.002)
Gross siblings income 0.00009 -.004 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.002) (0.0007)
Siblings eligibility*2 years apart 0.148
(0.053)
2 years apart 0.035
(0.034)
Post-policy period 0.565 0.55 0.637
(0.113) (0.109) (0.123)
Sibling in the 22-29 age group -.012 -.005 0.04
(0.037) (0.012) (0.014)
Intercept 6.295 5.782 5.930
(1.255) (1.202) (1.234)
Observations 6,435 6,435 6,435
R2 0.436 0.443 0.435
F test F(2,2610)=4.94 F(2,2610)=8.93 F(2,2610)=6.63
Prob > F 0.0072 0.0001 0.0013
Notes: EU-SILC data. This table shows the xed e¤ects OLS regression of siblings eligibility on individuals
household formation controlling for time varying parental characteristics and their interactions with siblings eligibility.
The upper panel includes a dummy for at least one parent younger than 50 years old (rst column); an indicator for
at least one parent healthy (second column); the gender combinations of the sibling pairs (third column). The lower
panel includes the siblings education (rst column); the siblings income (second column); a control for the pair of
siblings being less than two years apart (third column). All columns include the whole set of controls. F-test for the
hypothesis that 3 = 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: OLS Reduced form regression of individualsemployment on their
siblingssubsidy eligibility - Equation 3
(1) (2) (3)
Siblings subsidy eligibility - 3 0.042 0.039 0.04
(0.031) (0.031) (0.03)
Post-policy period - 1 -.104 -.255 -.163
(0.14) (0.157) (0.164)
Sibling in the 22-29 age group - 2 -.052 -.064 -.066
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Intercept - 0 -1.960 -4.463 -4.512
(1.711) (2.164) (2.184)
Individual controls yes yes yes
Siblings controls no yes yes
Macroeconomic controls no no yes
Observations 6,435 6,435 6,435
R2 0.113 0.117 0.118
F test F(1,2560)=1.84 F(1,2560)=1.62 F(1,2560)=1.74
Prob > F 0.1751 0.2039 0.1879
Notes: EU-SILC data. This table shows the xed e¤ects OLS regression of siblings eligibility
on employment. F-test for the hypothesis that 3;emp = 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7: OLS Reduced form regression - Placebo test - Equation 3
(1) (2) (3)
Siblings placebo eligibility -.030 -.025 -.025
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Post-policy placebo period 0.118 0.127 0.127
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
Sibling in the 22-29 age group 0.056 0.054 0.054
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Intercept 3.673 5.864 5.860
(0.864) (1.278) (1.266)
Individual controls yes yes yes
Siblings controls no yes yes
Macroeconomic controls no no yes
Observations 6,435 6,435 6,435
R2 0.39 0.434 0.434
F test F(1,2610)=2.72 F(1,2610)=2.15 F(1,2610)=2.12
Prob > F 0.0989 0.1426 0.1428
Notes: EU-SILC data. This table shows the OLS xed e¤ects regression of siblings placebo
eligibility (the interaction between the dummy for being interviewed after 2006, and the dummy for
being in the 22-29 age group) on individuals household formation. F-test for the hypothesis that
3;pla = 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
24
